



NEC's monthly monitor of Palestinian perceptions Towards politics and religion

With a special focus on women

Bulletin Vol. VI no 7+8

July-October 2010

NEC's Bulletin and the surveys associated with it are conducted independently with the private resources of the NEC company, and are not supported or funded by any local or international organization

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I. Introduction and Methodology

This report is a combination of the monthly surveys conducted in July and October. The ensuing analysis will review the October survey in particular with some comparisons with previous months.


Both surveys were based on telephone surveys that covered all of the oPt governorates, including East Jerusalem. The phone numbers were selected through an equal probability randomization process from the phone lists with the prefix assigned by the telephone company.

The July survey was carried between 23 till 25 on a sample of 930 respondents. The margin of error for the sample is +/-3.18% and the confidence level is 95%, while the second survey was conducted between 2 till 5 of October on a sample of 900 Palestinians. The margin of error is +/-3.2% and the confidence level is 95%.

Upon completion of the interviews, the data were checked and cleaned. As it is done regularly, the analysis in this report is based on cross-referencing the questions by five main independent or explanatory variables. These variables are: factional trust, region of residence, gender, age, and poverty level.

Figure 1 below, shows the demographic distribution related to the October survey.

Figure 1: Demographics





II. Main findings

- In October, 27% of Palestinians supported direct negotiations with Israel under any circumstance, compared to 43% who supported direct negotiations only on the condition that settlement activities are halted, while 30% opposed direct negotiations under all circumstances. In July, only 30% of Palestinians supported direct negotiations with Israel without any conditions as opposed to 37% that supported direct negotiations only if Israel halts settlement activity, while 33% opposed these negotiations in principle.
- The majority (90%) of the Palestinians believe that Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, is "not serious" in reaching a peace agreement through negotiations, compared to only 10% who think that Netanyahu is serious.
- Still, 68% of the Palestinians support reaching a peace agreement with Israel compared to 59% in July of this year, and 62% called on Hamas to change its position towards the elimination of Israel.
- The findings also reveal that 19% of the Palestinians expect a Palestinian state in the near future, 5% believe that this independent state will see the light within one year, 10% said that it will take 2-5 years, while 21% are of the opinion that the state will take more than 5 years for its creation, and 46% don't expect an independent Palestinian state to ever materialize.
- As for factional trust, the popularity of Fateh has increased to 50% compared to 44% in July 2010, so did the popularity of Hamas (from 7% to 9% during the same period) , while the percentage of those who do not trust any faction decreased from 45% in July 2010 to 37% nowadays.
- The respondent were also asked about the faction closest to them politically, 55% said Fateh, 11% said Hamas, and 5% said another faction, while 29% insisted that there is no existing faction that represents their political views.
- 51% of the respondents prefer Fateh's strategy compared to 9% that prefers the strategy of Hamas while 40% prefer neither.
- President Mahmoud Abbas kept his popularity as compared with Ismael Hanieh (52% versus 11% respectively), while 38% refused to answer the question.
- 62% said that Fayyad's government is the legitimate government in the oPt, while 15% said Hanieh's. Still, 24% believe that neither government if legitimate.
- In a question about how the Palestinians identify themselves, the results reveal that 61% identify themselves as "Muslims first", 20% as "Palestinians first", and 15% as "human being first", and 3% as "Arabs first."
- According to the results, there is an improvement in the sense of security of the Palestinians towards themselves, their families and their properties, (56% feel secure compared with 44% feel insecure). And 90% feel concerned about the situation in general.



- Al Jazeera Satellite station is the most trusted satellite TV station by the majority of the Palestinians, (44%); followed by 21% who trust Palestine TV, 15% trust Al-Arabiya, while 6% said that they don't trust any of the TV stations.
- As for the newspaper that the Palestinians trust more, Al-Quds newspaper occupied the first position (46%), followed by Al Ayyam newspaper (13%), while 14% expressed their lack of confidence in any newspaper.
- On a scale from zero to ten, where zero means very negative and ten means very positive. UNRWA got 6 out of ten, 5 for the European Union, 2 for the Obama administration, the PLO, the Palestinian Authority, the Presidential Office and the Fayyad government got 6, while the Hamas government got only 3.
- In July, the results revealed that 45% would vote for a Fateh list in the next election, compared to 6% for Hamas, and 11% for other lists, while 38% would not participate or refrain.
- Regarding the winner in the next elections, about 65% of the Palestinians expected Fateh to win compared to 10% that said Hamas, while 25% expected other parties to win.
- The majority (71%) of the respondents expressed their opposition to enacting a new law that prohibits polygamy, (82% of the males oppose it vs. 59% are females), compared with 29% that supported such a law. (41% of those who support enacting the law are females vs. 18% are males).
- The greater part, 84%, agreed to send their sons to study abroad if they receive a scholarship, 56% opposed it if their daughters received it.
- Only 19% believe that the effectiveness of women organizations in improving the situation of women in Palestine is very strong, 41% believe that they do have some impact, 20% said that they have only a limited impact while 20% of those institutions do not work effectively at all in improving women conditions.
- Regarding wearing the Hijab, 58% of the Palestinians think that wearing Al Hijab should be a personal decision, 66% of them are males, compared to 42% who believe that it should be obligatory, 50% of them are females.
- The results show that there is considerable opposition to the beatings of the wives by their husbands. The majority (90%) opposed beating a husband of his wife when he feels nervous, compared with 10% that support it. 87% opposed beating the wife in case she left the house without telling them, versus 13% that support that. 85% oppose the idea of beating a wife if she argued with the husband, and the same proportion also opposes it if a wife neglected the children.
- On a question about who is in charge of their household's finances and spending, 46% said mainly the husband, 5% said the wife, and 46% said both the husband and wife, while 2% mentioned other family members.



III. General situation

A. Level of concern

In comparison with the last two months, the level of concern among the Palestinians has increased significantly. As shown in figure 2, below, the percentage of people who feel concerned these days reaches 91% of which 44% are extremely concerned. As noted in tables 1 and 2, the level of concern is more intense among Gaza Strip residents, males, Fateh supporters, and the older generation respondents, while it is the least among the supporters of Hamas, the younger generation, and females.

Figure 2: Level of concern




Table 1: Level of concern about the current situation according to region and faction

	Region of residence		Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Extremely concerned	39%	52%	47%	37%	50%	45%
Concerned to some extent	49%	42%	44%	53%	40%	46%
Not very concerned	9%	3%	6%	4%	3%	7%
Not concerned at all	3%	2%	3%	5%	7%	2%

Table 2: Level of concern about the situation according to gender, age and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Extremely concerned	49%	40%	30%	42%	49%	58%	61%	48%	42%
Concerned to some extent	41%	52%	51%	50%	46%	37%	36%	43%	49%
Not very concerned	8%	5%	14%	6%	3%	5%	3%	5%	7%
Not concerned at all	3%	3%	5%	3%	3%	1%	0%	3%	2%



The main source of concern remained to be the economic condition of the household. About 39% of the respondents said that the main reason for their concern is the economic situation followed by the internal dispute (24%), and the Israeli occupation (7%)¹. About 18% attributed their concern to the absence of security, and 5% to family problems.

The economic hardships concentrated between those who trust no faction and among the West Bank respondents whereas the internal power struggle was more of an issue in the Gaza Strip, as illustrated in tables 3 and 4, below.

Figure 3: The main reason for feeling concerned




Table 3: The main reason for feeling concerned according to region and faction

	Region of residence		Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
The economic hardship	42%	35%	38%	33%	34%	41%
The absence of security	16%	20%	18%	21%	21%	17%
The internal power struggle	19%	31%	25%	24%	25%	24%
The Israeli occupation	7%	8%	6%	12%	7%	7%
Family problems	6%	3%	4%	7%	9%	6%
I have no concerns	9%	3%	8%	4%	3%	5%

¹ This option is not read to the interviewees.



Table 4: Main issue that makes you feel concerned according to gender, age and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
The economic hardship	37%	41%	28%	37%	46%	47%	42%	49%	30%
The absence of security	18%	18%	17%	18%	20%	16%	16%	15%	21%
The internal power struggle	27%	21%	24%	26%	23%	22%	26%	22%	29%
The Israeli occupation	9%	6%	9%	8%	4%	6%	10%	4%	8%
Family problems	2%	8%	7%	5%	4%	4%	5%	4%	5%
Have no concerns	7%	7%	14%	6%	3%	6%	1%	6%	7%

B. Feeling of security

According to the results, there is an improvement in the sense of security of the Palestinians towards themselves, their families and their properties. As indicated in figure 4, 56% said that they feel secure compared with 44% that feel insecure.

Feeling of insecurity is more prevalent in the Gaza Strip and among the respondents trusting Fateh. The lack of progress on the external and internal political fronts probably explains why the level of insecurity among the supporters of Fateh is more intense than among the Hamas supporters.

Figure 4: Feeling of insecurity (January 2007 till Oct 2010)






Table 5: Feeling of security according to region and faction

	Region of residence		Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
I feel secure	60%	50%	53%	71%	68%	54%
I do not feel secure	40%	50%	47%	29%	32%	46%

Table 6: Feeling of security according to gender, age and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
I feel secure	58%	55%	55%	55%	58%	53%	59%	56%	55%
I do not feel secure	42%	45%	45%	45%	42%	47%	41%	44%	45%

C. Identity

As indicated, below, more than half of the Palestinian public identify themselves as primarily Muslims. Only 20% identified themselves as Palestinians first. The importance of identity in shaping political and social attitudes prompted NEC to start monitoring the notion of identity regularly for the hope of shedding more light on the way Palestinians think about their lives in general and about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in particular. As noted in tables 7 and 8, below, identification with Islam is prominent among all sectors of the Palestinian society, including those that are received to be less religious, such as those who support left parties. Although 81% of the respondents that trust Hamas identify with Islam, first, 56% of the respondents of Fateh also identify with Islam first.

While not significantly higher, the younger generation identify with Islam more so than the older generation

Figure 5: Self identification






Table 7: Self identification according to region and faction

	Region of residence		Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Muslim First	56%	70%	56%	81%	38%	66%
Palestinian First	23%	16%	24%	11%	42%	14%
Arab First	4%	1%	3%	2%	3%	3%
Human being first	17%	13%	16%	7%	17%	17%
Other	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%

Table 8: Self identification according to gender, age and poverty level

	Gender		Age				Poverty level		
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Muslim First	59%	64%	64%	63%	61%	58%	58%	64%	57%
Palestinian First	22%	18%	19%	19%	20%	21%	23%	20%	21%
Arab First	3%	3%	2%	3%	1%	3%	8%	2%	3%
Human being first	17%	14%	15%	15%	17%	17%	10%	13%	18%
Other	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	0%	1%

D. Immigration

When the respondents were asked about their thoughts about migration, 28% of them said that they did think about leaving Palestine as opposed to 72% who don't prefer to do so. It is notable that the residents in Gaza Strip, Fateh supporters, and males are more interested in the idea if immigration than do their counterparts, as indicated in tables 9 and 10, below.

Figure 6: Thinking about emigration abroad






Table 9: Thinking about emigration abroad according to region and faction

	Region of residence		Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Yes	22%	36%	33%	19%	31%	25%
No	78%	64%	67%	81%	69%	75%

Table 10: Thinking about emigration abroad according to gender, age and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Yes	32%	24%	37%	34%	22%	17%	15%	26%	29%
No	68%	76%	63%	66%	78%	83%	85%	74%	71%

IV. Palestinian politics

A. Leadership

Although President Abbas remains more popular amongst the Palestinians than Ismael Hanieh, the Hamas leader, a significant percentage (38%) of the Palestinians said that they do not trust either leader. As illustrated in figure 7, below, only 51% said that they trust President Abbas more compared to 11% that favored Ismael Hanieh who, as noted also in figure 6, is at a lowest rate in comparison to the previous months.

Naturally, support for Abu Mazen is wide spreads among the respondents that trust Fateh most (83%), while support for Hanieh is supported by 84% of the Hamas supporters. Of those who do not trust any faction, 70% do not trust either leader.

Generally speaking, support for President Abbas is higher in the West Bank (59%) than in the Gaza Strip (43%), among male respondents, older generation respondents and respondents that are economically better off, as noted in tables 11 and 12, below.



Figure 7: Trust Abu Mazen vs. Hanieh




Table 11: Trust in Abu Mazen vs. trust in Ismael Hanieh according to region and faction

	Region of residence			Faction trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Abu Mazen	59%	43%	83%	3%	35%	23%
Ismael Hanieh	7%	16%	1%	84%	11%	7%
Neither (DON'T READ)	33%	42%	16%	14%	53%	70%

Table 12: Trust in Abu Mazen vs. trust in Ismael Hanieh according to gender, age and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Abu Mazen	61%	44%	47%	54%	58%	52%	56%	50%	56%
Ismael Hanieh	10%	11%	12%	8%	11%	11%	13%	12%	10%
Neither (DON'T READ)	29%	45%	41%	38%	31%	38%	31%	38%	34%



B. Factional support

Factional support is not dissimilar from leadership support. While 9% of the respondents indicated their trust in Hamas and 49% in Fateh, 38% of the respondents stated their lack of trust in any of the existing political or religious factions. As it is the case with leadership support, level of support for Fateh is more prominent among the West Bank respondents. Whereas, for example, 54% of the West Bank respondents indicated their trust in Fateh, the percentage in the Gaza Strip was only 45%. Conversely, whereas the level of support for Hamas in the West Bank did not exceed 6%, the percentage in the Gaza Strip was 13%, as noted in table 13.

Support for Fateh is also more pronounced among males than among females, and among the respondents that are economically better off than among those who are economically not as fortunate. Also, lack of trust in any faction is higher among females (45%) than among males (29%).

In a comparison between that July and October surveys, the popularity of Fateh has increased to 50% compared to 44% in July 2010, so did the popularity of Hamas (from 7% to 9% during the same period), while the percentage of those who do not trust any faction decreased from 45% in July 2010 to 37% nowadays.

Figure 8: Factional trust






Table 13: Factional trust according to region of residence

	Region of residence	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Fateh	54%	45%
Hamas	6%	13%
Others	4%	3%
None	36%	39%

Table 14: Factional trust according to gender, age and poverty

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Fateh	58%	42%	48%	52%	52%	47%	50%	47%	53%
Hamas	8%	10%	9%	7%	10%	12%	8%	10%	9%
Others	4%	3%	3%	3%	6%	2%	4%	3%	4%
None	29%	45%	39%	38%	33%	38%	38%	40%	34%

To further gauge the extent of factional support, the respondents were also asked about the faction closest to them politically. As illustrated in figure 9, below, 55% said Fateh, 11% said Hamas, and 5% said another faction, while 29% insisted that there is no existing faction that represents their political views.

Once again, the results according to the explanatory variables were consistent with the previous question on factional trust. As pointed out in tables 15 and 16, below, three fourth of the respondents that do not trust any faction do not find either faction to be close to their political views.

Figure 9: The faction that is close to your political ideology






Table 15: The faction that is close to your political ideology according to region and faction

	Region of residence			Faction trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Fateh	59%	49%	98%	0%	24%	14%
Hamas	8%	16%	0%	96%	17%	5%
Others	5%	5%	1%	0%	38%	7%
No one	29%	30%	1%	4%	20%	74%

Table 16: The faction that is close to your political ideology according to gender, age and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Fateh	63%	46%	56%	56%	56%	52%	50%	50%	59%
Hamas	10%	12%	11%	10%	13%	13%	9%	12%	11%
Others	4%	6%	3%	6%	3%	7%	10%	4%	6%
No one	22%	36%	30%	29%	28%	29%	32%	34%	25%

C. The Gaza vs. Ramallah governments

Previous surveys by NEC showed that support for Fateh is largely based on the belief that Fateh is more realistic while support for Hamas is closely related to the religiosity of Palestinians and the identification they have with Islam.

In measuring the extent to which Fateh and Hamas are perceived politically by the Palestinians, a number of questions have been asked regularly to the Palestinians. The first is related to the type of strategy the Palestinians find to be more appropriate for the materialization of the Palestinian national interest and the other is related to the perception about the legality of the Ramallah government as opposed to the Gaza government.

1. Attitude about the Best strategy

Despite the strong identification people have with Islam, only 9% of the respondents said that the Hamas strategy is the best for maximizing Palestinian national interest. Conversely, 51% believe that the Fateh strategy is the most appropriate. Still, 40% of the respondents indicated no preference to either strategy.

Once again, distrust in both the Hamas and Fateh policies and strategies is reflected more among the respondents that do not trust any faction (70%), among female respondents (46%), and among the respondents that live in poverty (41%). These and other results are previewed in tables 17 and 18, below.



Figure 10: The best strategy to achieve the national supreme interests




Table 17: The best strategy to achieve national interest according to region and faction

	Region of residence		Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
The strategy of Fateh	57%	45%	88%	0%	48%	25%
The strategy of Hamas	6%	12%	0%	74%	10%	6%
Neither (DON'T READ)	37%	42%	12%	26%	43%	70%

Table 18: The best strategy to achieve national interest according to gender, age and poverty

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
The strategy of Fateh	60%	44%	48%	54%	54%	49%	56%	50%	55%
The strategy of Hamas	7%	10%	9%	7%	10%	9%	11%	9%	9%
Neither (DON'T READ)	33%	46%	42%	39%	36%	42%	33%	41%	36%



2. Attitude about the legitimate government in the oPt

Given the lack of trust on many issues related to both Fateh and Hamas, Palestinian public perceptions slightly changes when the questions were associated with the Fayyad government. As indicated in figure 11, below, support for the Fayyad government reaches 61% as opposed to 15% for the Hanieh Government. Whereas, as indicated earlier, about 40% voiced their lack of trust in either Fateh or Hamas leaderships or policies, only 24% of the respondents said neither government is illegitimate. Further analysis shows that the reason is because a significant percentage of the respondents that do not trust anyone gave their support to Salaam Fayyad who is known to be independent and not affiliated to any of the political or religious factions. In addition, the positive attitude people have towards the prime minister may be a testimony to the effective impact the Fayyad Government had on the Palestinians' daily life, and due to the significant support he gauges from his Fateh allies.

When examined according to the other explanatory variables (tables 19 and 20), the results highlight the remarkable progress on the level of support for Dr. Salam Fayyad's government, when compared with that of Hanieh in Gaza. Fayyad has strong standing among all sectors of the Palestinian society although his government is perceived more positively by the older generation, by West Bank respondents, male, and by the respondents that trusts Fateh.

Figure 11: The legitimate government in the oPt (Sep 2007 till Oct 2010)




Table 19: The legitimate government in the oPt according to region and faction

	Region of residence		Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
The government of Salam Fayyad	68%	53%	92%	3%	53%	33%
The Hanieh government	11%	20%	1%	91%	12%	16%
No one is legitimate (DON'T READ)	21%	27%	6%	6%	36%	51%



Table 20: The legitimate government in the oPt according to gender, age category and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
The government of Salam Fayyad	67%	56%	59%	66%	63%	56%	68%	58%	66%
The Hanieh government	13%	16%	17%	10%	18%	15%	13%	16%	14%
No one is legitimate (DON'T READ)	20%	28%	24%	24%	19%	29%	19%	27%	20%

V. Palestinian Israeli relations

A. The peace settlement

As portrayed in figure 12, a significant increase towards the support of peace settlement with Israel was witnessed in October although, as will be discussed later, only 10% of the respondents think that Netanyahu is genuine about reaching a peace settlement with the Palestinians. While in July 59% of the respondents said that they support a peace settlement with Israel, the percentage increased to 68% by October 2010.

Even among the supporters of Hamas, 34%, as opposed to 80% among the Fateh supporters, support a peace settlement with Israel. As always, the position of the respondents that do not trust any faction falls in the middle of the positions of both Hamas and Fateh on the peace agreement with Israel. As pointed out in table 21, 61% of the non-partisans support reaching a peace settlement.

Figure 12: Support or oppose a peace settlement with Israel






Table 21: Support or opposition to a peace settlement with Israel according to region and faction

	Region of residence		Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Support	70%	66%	80%	34%	70%	61%
Oppose	30%	34%	20%	66%	30%	39%

Table 22: Support or opposition to a peace settlement with Israel according to gender, age and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Support	73%	64%	58%	70%	69%	77%	77%	68%	69%
Oppose	27%	36%	42%	30%	31%	23%	23%	32%	31%

B. Hamas and Israel

The attitude towards the position of Hamas towards the existence of the state of Israel carries a lot of significance and provides explanations about the extent to which the Palestinian public accepts coexistence with Israel. Since NEC started its monthly survey five years ago, the respondents were asked about whether or not they approved of Hamas’s position towards Israel, a position which essentially opposes the presence of Israel on the historic land of Palestine that is perceived by Hamas as being inherently Islamic.

Without any exception, Palestinian position in this regard, has consistently been against the Hamas’s position. As illustrated in figure 13, below, more than 60% of the Palestinians reject the position of Hamas. A position shared by most Palestinians except by the majority of the supporters of Hamas who line behind the organization.

When examining the results according to the demographic characteristics of the population, it is evident that the younger the respondents are the more likely respondents to support the position of Hamas towards the existence of Israel, so do females in comparison with males. As indicated in table 22, 47% of the respondents between the age of 18 and 24 support the position of Hamas while only 30% of the respondents over the age of 55 share this view. Not surprising is that half the respondents that do not trust any faction support the position of Hamas vis-à-vis the existence of the state of Israel. This and other results are overviewed in tables 23 and 24, below.



Figure 13: Attitude about whether Hamas should maintain its position on the elimination of Israel




Table 23: Support or oppose Hamas' position towards the elimination of Israel according to region and faction

	Region of residence		Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Hamas should maintain its position on Israel	34%	43%	18%	84%	36%	50%
Hamas should change its position regarding Israel	66%	57%	82%	16%	64%	50%

Table 24: Support or oppose Hamas' position towards the elimination of Israel according to gender, age category and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Hamas should maintain its position on Israel	29%	47%	47%	37%	38%	26%	30%	39%	37%
Hamas should change its position regarding Israel	71%	53%	53%	63%	62%	74%	70%	61%	63%



C. Direct negotiations with Israel

Direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority were resumed shortly in early September 2010, following the meeting between US President Barack Obama, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and Mahmoud Abbas. The ultimate aim of the direct negotiations at that time was reaching a "final status settlement" to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by implementing a two-state solution.

Despite a relatively long period of stagnation in U.S. Middle East efforts to reach a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, the Americans and the international community have continued in recent days to exert considerable pressure on both Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to resume direct negotiations.

To take a closer look at the Palestinian point of views towards direct negotiation, NEC asked the Palestinians about their views towards this issue three times in different periods. As shown in the figure, below, 27% of Palestinians support direct negotiations with Israel under any condition, 43% said that they will support direct negotiations only on the condition that settlement activities are halted, while 30% oppose the direct negotiations under all circumstances.

In a comparison between July and October surveys, it seems that there is a slight decrease in the unconditional support for direct negotiations (from 30% in July to 27% in October) and a significant increase in the support for negotiations if Israel stops settlement activities (from 37% to 43%).

As pointed out in tables 25 and 26, below, there are no differences in opinions among the various sectors of the Palestinian society with the exception of the supporters of Hamas.

Figure 14: Support for the direct negotiations with Israel






Table 25: The support for the direct negotiations with Israel according to region and faction

	Region of residence		Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Yes in all cases	27%	28%	33%	5%	32%	25%
Yes in case ending the settlement	47%	37%	51%	25%	41%	37%
Totally oppose	25%	35%	16%	70%	27%	38%

Table 26: The support for the direct negotiations with Israel according to gender, age category and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Yes in all cases	28%	27%	29%	26%	27%	28%	27%	26%	28%
Yes in case ending the settlement	45%	41%	38%	46%	43%	47%	45%	41%	46%
Totally oppose	27%	32%	34%	27%	31%	25%	28%	33%	27%

D. The Palestinian attitude towards the Netanyahu government regarding peace with the Palestinians (Oct 2010)

Following the suspension of direct negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis after the resumption of Israel's settlement activity, the results show that the majority (90%) of the Palestinians believe that Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, is "not serious" in reaching a peace agreement through negotiations, compared to only 10% who think that Netanyahu is serious. As indicated in tables 27 and 28, below, all Palestinians, share this view including the respondents that trust Fateh most.

Figure 15: Attitude towards the seriousness of the Netanyahu government towards reaching a peace settlement with the Palestinians






Table 27: Attitude towards the seriousness of the Netanyahu government towards reaching a peace settlement with the Palestinians according to region and faction

	Region of residence		Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Serious	9%	13%	11%	8%	14%	10%
Not serious	91%	87%	89%	92%	86%	90%

Table 28: Attitude towards the seriousness of the Netanyahu government towards reaching a peace settlement with the Palestinians according to gender, age category and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Serious	10%	11%	16%	9%	8%	8%	10%	11%	10%
Not serious	90%	89%	84%	91%	92%	92%	90%	89%	90%

VI. NEC’s Elections Monitor (July 2010)

Despite the fact that the Palestinian Authority intended to carry out elections in the oPt, the Hamas government in Gaza has refused to allow them in areas under its control unless a reconciliation between Hamas and Fateh is reached. In the following pages we will try to examine Palestinian voting preferences.

When NEC asked the respondents about the party they would vote for in the next elections, the results showed that 45% said that they would vote for Fateh, 6% said that they would vote for Hamas, while 38% stated that they will not participate in the elections. More in-depth analysis reveals that the respondents that said they will not participate in the elections or who did not answer were either females or respondents that did not trust any faction.

Figure 16: The affiliation of the next election n case elections were held next week






Table 29: The affiliation of the respondents in case elections were held next week according to region and faction

	Region of residence		Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Fateh list	47%	41%	85%	7%	17%	19%
Hamas list	6%	7%	1%	61%	3%	3%
Others	10%	14%	3%	2%	53%	15%
Will not vote or refrain	38%	38%	11%	29%	27%	63%

Table 30: The affiliation of the respondents in case elections were held next week according to gender, age and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Fateh list	53%	36%	46%	40%	48%	46%	45%	41%	47%
Hamas list	6%	7%	7%	5%	8%	6%	4%	6%	6%
Others	12%	11%	13%	8%	10%	12%	14%	11%	11%
Will not vote or refrain	29%	47%	34%	47%	35%	36%	37%	41%	36%

To further assess the extent of support for the various factions in case elections were to be held soon, NEC asked another question, irrespective of their personal preferences, regarding who the respondents think will win in the elections. In general about 65% of the Palestinians expected Fateh to win compared to 10% that said Hamas, while 25% expected other parties to win.

When examining the results according to the explanatory variables, it is noted that even one quarter of the supporters of Hamas think that Fateh will win so did almost half the respondents that do not trust any faction, as noted in tables 31 and 32, below.

Figure 17: Regardless of your political affiliation, who would you expect to be the winner if elections were to be held next week (July 2010)






Table 31: Regardless of your political affiliation, who would you expect to be the winner if elections were to be held next week according to region and faction

	Region of residence		Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Fateh	67%	62%	93%	24%	57%	45%
Hamas	8%	14%	2%	64%	10%	8%
Others	26%	24%	4%	12%	33%	47%

Table 32: Regardless your political affiliation, who would you expect to be a winner if election agreed to be held next week according to gender, age and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Fateh	73%	56%	71%	66%	63%	61%	55%	60%	68%
Hamas	7%	14%	11%	8%	12%	13%	5%	12%	9%
Others	20%	31%	17%	26%	25%	26%	40%	27%	24%

VII. Expectations about the possibility of a Palestinian State in the future (Oct 2010)

The respondents were asked a question on their views about when a Palestinian state will materialize, As indicated in figure 18, below, only 19% of the Palestinians expect a Palestinian state to materialize in the near future, 5% believe that this independent state will see the light within one year, 10% said that it will take 2-5 years, while 21% are of the opinion that the state will take more than 5 years for its creation, and 46% don't expect an independent Palestinian state to ever materialize.

The respondents who seemed pessimistic towards the materialization of an independent Palestinian state concentrated between those who are economically better off, females, and the respondents that do not trust any faction, as noted in the tables, below.

Figure 18: the period you expect the Palestinian state to be established in






Table 33: the period you expect the Palestinian state to be established in according to region and faction

	Region of residence		Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Very soon	18%	20%	18%	28%	6%	17%
Within a year	5%	4%	6%	5%	3%	4%
From 2-5 years	12%	8%	16%	4%	13%	4%
Over five years	20%	22%	20%	20%	28%	22%
I don't expect a Palestinian state	46%	46%	40%	43%	50%	53%

Table 34: the period you expect the Palestinian state to be established in according to gender, age and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Very soon	17%	21%	15%	18%	22%	17%	27%	24%	14%
Within a year	5%	5%	5%	6%	4%	2%	7%	5%	4%
From 2-5 years	12%	8%	9%	9%	10%	11%	10%	8%	13%
Over five years	22%	19%	21%	20%	27%	20%	15%	21%	22%
I don't expect a Palestinian state	44%	47%	50%	48%	37%	49%	40%	42%	46%

VIII. Public evaluation of some local and international organizations

The respondents were also asked about their assessment of some organizations and agencies on a scale from zero to ten, where zero means very negative and ten means very positive.

As shown in the figure below, UNRWA got 6 out of ten, 5 for the European Union, 2 for the Obama's administration. The PLO, the Palestinian Authority, the Presidential Office and the Fayyad government got 6, while the Hamas government got only 3. The analysis in tables 35 and 36, below provide further information about the evaluation of these organizations by the various sectors of the Palestinian population. Most noteworthy is the higher level of trust in UNRWA by the Gaza Strip residents.



Figure 19: Evaluation of some local and international organizations




Table 35: Evaluation of some local and international organizations

	Region of residence			Faction trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
	Mean (average)					
UNRWA	6	7	6	6	6	6
European Union	5	5	5	4	5	5
Obama administrations	3	2	3	1	2	2
PLO	6	6	7	3	5	5
PA	6	6	8	3	5	6
The president office	6	6	8	3	4	5
Fayyad government	7	6	8	2	5	6
Hamas government	3	3	2	7	3	4

Table 36: Evaluation of some local and international organizations

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
	Mean (average)								
UNRWA	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
European Union	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Obama administrations	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2
PLO	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
PA	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
The president office	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Fayyad government	7	6	6	6	6	7	7	6	7
Hamas government	3	4	3	3	4	3	4	4	3



IX. Media

The respondents were also asked about the level of trust they have for the different types of media that they are exposed to. As for the newspaper² that the Palestinians trust more, Al-Quds newspaper occupied the first position (46%), followed by Al Ayyam newspaper (13%), while 14% expressed their lack of confidence in any newspaper.

Trust in newspapers by the various sectors of the respondents is overviewed in tables 37 and 38, below.

Figure 20: The newspaper that most trusted




Table 37: The newspaper that most trusted according to region and faction

	Region of residence			Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	
AlAyyam	10%	17%	16%	7%	7%	11%	
AlQuds	58%	28%	49%	34%	56%	48%	
AlHayyat	6%	6%	7%	1%	0%	6%	
Palestine/AIRisala	3%	11%	5%	19%	10%	3%	
Foreign newspapers	1%	3%	1%	3%	8%	1%	
Don't trust any	1%	4%	3%	3%	3%	2%	
Others	9%	13%	6%	16%	15%	14%	
Do not read newspapers	11%	20%	13%	16%	0%	15%	

² The Palestinian newspapers that are published in the West Bank are prevented in the Gaza Strip by the Hamas government



Table 38: The newspaper that most trusted according to gender, age and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
AlAyyam	15%	11%	15%	17%	9%	9%	12%	12%	15%
AlQuds	47%	45%	46%	46%	50%	45%	40%	43%	49%
AlHayyat	6%	6%	5%	5%	4%	10%	8%	7%	6%
Palestine/AlRisala	6%	6%	9%	4%	6%	7%	6%	7%	6%
Foreign newspapers	2%	1%	1%	3%	2%	1%	0%	0%	3%
Don't trust any	2%	3%	1%	2%	3%	2%	2%	2%	3%
Others	11%	10%	9%	7%	16%	11%	12%	15%	8%
Do not read newspapers	11%	18%	14%	15%	10%	14%	19%	14%	12%

Al Jazeera Satellite station is the most trusted by the majority of the Palestinians, (44%), followed by 21% who trust Palestine TV, 15% trust Al-Arabiya, while 6% said that they don't trust any of the TV stations.

Al-Jazeera is more trusted by Hamas supporters and by the supporters that do not trust any faction than by Fateh supporters

It is noted here that there is improvement regarding the trust of the Palestine TV, (from 15% in April to 21% now) and a significant drop in the level of trust in Al-Jazeera, despite the fact that they continue to be ranked number one.

Figure 21: The TV stations that most trusted




Table 39: The TV stations that most trusted according to region and faction

	Region of residence		Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Palestine TV	21%	21%	32%	3%	10%	13%
Al-Arabiya	14%	18%	21%	2%	22%	10%
Al-Jazeera	50%	37%	33%	50%	56%	53%
Al-Manar	5%	3%	4%	7%	6%	3%
Al-Aqsa (Hamas's TV)	4%	7%	3%	31%	4%	2%
BBC	1%	2%	1%	1%	0%	1%
CNN	0%	1%	1%	2%	0%	1%
Other Arab TV station	2%	4%	1%	1%	3%	5%
Other non Arab TV stations	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%
Don't trust any	4%	8%	3%	3%	0%	9%



Table 40: The TV stations that most trusted according to gender, age and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Palestine TV	20%	21%	17%	20%	20%	27%	23%	23%	17%
Al-Arabiyah	19%	12%	13%	16%	20%	10%	14%	11%	20%
Al-Jazeera	43%	46%	52%	43%	38%	45%	45%	49%	42%
Al-Manar	4%	4%	3%	3%	5%	3%	8%	4%	3%
Al-Aqsa	3%	8%	5%	7%	7%	5%	0%	4%	6%
BBC	1%	1%	1%	3%	0%	0%	1%	0%	2%
CNN	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Other Arab TV station	2%	3%	1%	3%	2%	3%	3%	2%	3%
Other non-Arab stations	1%	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%
Don't trust any	7%	5%	7%	5%	6%	5%	7%	5%	6%

X. Special focus: Issues around Palestinian Women (July 2010)

In October, NEC put some questions pertaining to the attitude Palestinians have towards women as part of its aspiration to shed the light on some issues related to Palestinian development and the rights and status of the various sectors in the Palestinian society. About 10 questions were asked to the respondents in the July survey about issues concerning women: polygamy, beating, etc.

A. Polygamy

As for polygamy, NEC tried to address this social issue within the Palestinian society, by asking about the Palestinian support for a law to prevent polygamy. The importance of asking such a question was also to show the extent to which Palestinian preferences are towards enacting religious law in the Palestinian society as opposed to civil laws.

The results reveal that the majority (71%) of the respondents expressed their opposition to enacting a new law that prohibits polygamy, (82% of the males oppose it vs. 59% of females), compared with 29% that supported such a law. (41% of those who support enacting the law are females vs. 18% are males).

Women, more than men, prefer the enactment of a law prohibiting polygamy

Figure 22: Level of support for enacting a law in Palestine preventing polygamy






Table 41: Level of support for enacting a law in Palestine preventing polygamy according to region and faction

	Region of residence		Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Yes	27%	32%	31%	21%	46%	28%
No	73%	68%	69%	79%	54%	72%

Table 42: Level of support for enacting a law in Palestine preventing polygamy according to gender, age and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Yes	18%	41%	29%	28%	32%	22%	34%	29%	26%
No	82%	59%	71%	72%	68%	78%	66%	71%	74%

B. Man and women rights

When asked about overseas education of children in case they were awarded a scholarship, the greater part of the Palestinians, 84%, said that they have no objection to send their sons to study abroad if they receive a scholarship, 56% opposed it if their daughters received it.

By looking at the data according to the demographic variables, it is obvious that Hamas supporter, males, older generation who are over 55 years old and those who live in poverty, oppose the idea of sending their daughters abroad if they got a scholarship, and more than other Palestinian sub-groups, as appeared in tables 43 and 44, below.

Figure 23: If your son got a scholarship abroad, would you support him to travel abroad






Figure 24: if the female got a scholarship abroad you support her to travel abroad




Table 43: if the female got a scholarship abroad you support her to travel abroad according to region and faction

	Region of residence		Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Yes	44%	43%	44%	33%	59%	45%
No	56%	57%	56%	67%	41%	55%

Table 44: if the female got a scholarship abroad you support her to travel abroad according to gender, age and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Yes	42%	46%	44%	43%	44%	49%	41%	40%	46%
No	58%	54%	56%	57%	56%	51%	59%	60%	54%

C. Attitude towards the Hijab

The Hijab becomes a traditional concept more than a religious representation in the Palestinian society in particular and in the Arab-Islamic countries in general. The respondents were exposed to a question on their attitude towards Hijab, as being obligatory or a personal issue.

Regarding wearing the Hijab, 58% of the Palestinians think that wearing Al Hijab should be a personal decision as opposed to 42% who believe that it should be obligatory. Surprisingly, while 66% of those who hold this view are males, the proportion of females that share this view is less than half, as indicated in table 46, below. Furthermore, supporter of Hamas, more so than the Fateh supporters, support of enforcing the wearing of the Hijab, as indicated also in table 45, below.



Figure 25: The veil should be a personal issue or obligatory




Table 45: The veil should be a personal issue or obligatory according to region and faction

	Region of residence			Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	
Personal choice	58%	58%	67%	35%	69%	54%	
Obligatory	41%	41%	33%	61%	31%	45%	
Other	1%	1%	1%	3%	0%	1%	

Table 46: The veil should be a personal issue or obligatory according to gender, age and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Personal choice	66%	49%	53%	58%	60%	64%	58%	58%	60%
Obligatory	32%	50%	47%	42%	38%	36%	40%	42%	40%
Other	1%	0%	0%	0%	2%	1%	2%	0%	1%

D. Household finances

On a question about who is in charge of the household's finances and spending, 46% of the respondents said mainly the husband, 5% said the wife, and 46% said both the husband and wife, while 2% mentioned other family members, as illustrated in figure 26. These results are consistent among all sectors of the Palestinian society except when analyzed according to gender. As pointed out in table 48, while 51% of males said that males are in charge of the households financing, the percentage among the female respondents who share this view is only 41%.



Figure 26: Home income is controlled primarily by




Table 47: Home income is controlled primarily by according to region and faction

	Region of residence			Faction trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
The Husband	47%	45%	49%	52%	43%	47%
The wife	4%	5%	5%	6%	0%	6%
Both	46%	45%	44%	39%	57%	42%
Other members of the family	2%	3%	2%	1%	0%	4%
Other	1%	2%	1%	1%	0%	2%

Table 48: Home income is controlled primarily by according to gender, age and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
The Husband	51%	41%	52%	45%	45%	42%	42%	46%	45%
The wife	4%	5%	3%	4%	2%	11%	4%	5%	4%
Both	43%	49%	40%	47%	52%	43%	47%	43%	49%
Other members of the family	1%	3%	3%	2%	0%	2%	5%	3%	2%
Other	1%	2%	1%	1%	0%	2%	3%	3%	0%

E. Women's institutions' roles

As it is known, women's organizations have been created to assess the reality and needs of Palestinian women and to devise programs to meet these needs. So NEC opted to assess the role of these organizations in the oPt, by shedding the light on the Palestinian public perceptions towards these organizations.



When asked about their evaluation of the impact of women organizations in improving women’s conditions in general, the results show that only 19% believe that the effectiveness of women organizations in improving the situation of women in Palestine was significant, 41% believed that they do have some impact, 20% said that they have only a limited impact while 20% believe that those organizations do not work effectively at all in improving women conditions. As stated in tables 49 and 50, below, the most negative attitude towards the role of women organizations is from among the supporters of Hamas. The attitude women respondents had was not dissimilar to that of the male respondents.

Figure 27: Perceptions about the extent to which women organizations contribute to improving the situation of women




Table 49: Perceptions about the extent to which women organizations contribute to improving the situation of women according to region and faction

	Region of residence			Faction trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
To large extent	21%	16%	22%	13%	24%	16%
To some extent	40%	43%	43%	45%	31%	39%
To a small extent	21%	19%	20%	13%	14%	20%
Has no effective role at all	18%	22%	15%	30%	32%	25%

Table 50: Perceptions about the extent to which women organizations contribute to improving the situation of women according to gender, age and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
To large extent	19%	19%	16%	22%	19%	19%	18%	18%	18%
To some extent	38%	44%	50%	36%	39%	36%	41%	44%	40%
To a small extent	23%	18%	22%	19%	19%	20%	24%	21%	20%
Has no effective role at all	20%	19%	12%	22%	24%	25%	17%	17%	22%



F. Wife beating

NEC asked several questions on the issue of beating women by their husbands. As portrayed in figure 28, below, 90% of the respondents said that they oppose the idea of beating the wife compared to 10% who support it.

The vast majority of the Palestinians oppose the idea of wife beating under all circumstances

While the majority do oppose the notion of wife beating, the percentage who support this view is higher among the supporters of Hamas and among the male respondents. Whereas, for example 14% of the male respondents supported wife beating, the percentage among the female respondents was 6%.

Figure 28: The right of husband to beat his wife in case he felt very angry




Table 51: The right of husband to beat his wife in case he felt very angry according to region and faction

	Region of residence			Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	
Yes	9%	11%	11%	14%	3%	9%	
No	91%	89%	88%	86%	97%	91%	

Table 52: The right of husband to beat his wife in case he felt very angry according to gender, age and poverty level


	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Yes	14%	6%	9%	12%	9%	10%	7%	10%	10%
No	86%	94%	91%	88%	91%	90%	93%	90%	90%



The other cases given to the respondents regarding wife beating were related to beating in case the wife went out without telling her husband, or if she neglected the children and if she argued with her husband.

It is notable here that although the majority of the respondents oppose the beating in all cases, slightly more respondents supported the notion of house beating in case the wife “neglected the children” or if she argued against her husband.

Figure 29: The extent you support the husband beating his wife if she doing the following



XI. The economy

A. Evolution of poverty

The results of the October survey indicate that the poverty level of the Palestinian population has worsened in comparison with July 2010. Currently, 46% of the respondents live in poverty, as noted in figure 30. The poverty level is slightly higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. Whereas 47% of the households in the Gaza Strip were determined as falling under the poverty line, the percentage in the West Bank is 45%, as indicated in table 53.

It's worth mentioning that the higher percentages of poverty level occur between the older generations, those above 55 years old, and between the respondents who don't trust any of the factions (58%, 50% respectively).



Figure 30: Evolution of the poverty levels in oPt (March 2006 till Oct 2010)




Table 53: Poverty level according to region and faction

	Region of residence		Faction trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Below poverty	45%	47%	42%	48%	36%	50%
Above poverty	55%	53%	58%	52%	64%	50%

Table 54: Poverty level according to gender and age

	Gender		Age				
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above
Below poverty	45%	46%	48%	34%	49%	49%	58%
Above poverty	55%	54%	52%	66%	51%	51%	42%

B. Employment

Apparently, the unemployment rate has decreased in comparison with July. While in July, the unemployment rate was 19%, it reaches in October up to 28%.

About 56% of the respondents that are part of the labor force said that they are fully employed, 16% partially employed, and 28% said that they were not employed at all. Unemployment levels are significantly higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank.



While 21% of the respondents that participate in the labor force in the West Bank said that they were unemployed, the percentage in the Gaza Strip reached 37%.

The highest levels of unemployment are among the respondents that are below the age of 24 and whose households are determined to be impoverished. As pointed out in table 66, 42% of the respondents that live in poverty said that they are not employed to a mere 15% from within the families that live above the poverty level. These and other results are overviewed in tables 55 and 56, below.

Figure 31: Labor force




Table 55: Labor force according to region and faction

	Region of residence			Faction trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
I work full time	61%	49%	57%	58%	53%	55%
I work part time	18%	14%	14%	20%	29%	15%
Unemployed	21%	37%	29%	22%	18%	30%

Table 56: Labor force according to gender, age category and poverty level

	Gender		Age					Poverty level	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
I work full time	58%	51%	37%	64%	61%	61%	42%	38%	72%
I work part time	15%	20%	16%	16%	16%	19%	12%	20%	12%
Unemployed	27%	29%	47%	20%	23%	19%	45%	42%	15%
