



**NEC's monthly monitor of Palestinian perceptions  
Towards politics and religion  
With a special focus on the attitude towards the  
performance of Salam Fayyad**

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## I. Introduction and Methodology

This report is a combination of the monthly surveys conducted in April and May. The ensuing analysis will review the May survey in particular with some comparisons with previous months.


Both surveys were based on telephone surveys that covered all of the oPt governorates, including Jerusalem. The phone numbers were selected through an equal probability randomization process from the phone lists with the prefix assigned by the telephone company.

The April survey was carried between 22 till 27 on a sample of 950 respondents. The margin of error for the sample is +/-3.18% and the confidence level is 95%, while the second survey was conducted between 28 till 30 of May on a sample of 1000 Palestinians. The margin of error is +/-3.1% and the confidence level is 95%.

Upon completion of the interviews, the data were checked and cleaned. As it is done regularly, the analysis in this report is based on cross-referencing the questions by five main independent or explanatory variables. These variables are: factional trust, governorate (The West Bank and Gaza Strip), gender, age, and poverty level.

Figure 1 below, shows the demographics that are related to the May survey. These results correspond to the national demographics. About half of the respondents were refugees, and 9% lives in a refugee camp, 58% in a city and 34% in a village.

Figure 1: Demographics



In addition, the results show that 50% lives in poverty and the majority has a higher education. As for the age distribution, 24% of the respondents were between 18-24 years old, 27% were between 25-34 years old, 22 % were between 35-44 years old, 16% were between 45-54 years old, and 11% were over the age of 55.



## II. Main findings

- As for their general outlook, the large majority of the Palestinians (83%) feel concerned about the present conditions.
- The main source of concern remained to be the economic condition of the household (40%), followed by the internal dispute (19%), and the Israeli occupation with 11% - noting that this option was not provided to the respondents- 14% referred it back to the absence of a secure life, and 4% due to family problems. In addition, more than the half (53%) feel secure toward themselves, their properties and their families, versus 47% feel otherwise.
- The survey shows that the majority of 85% supports the campaign for boycotting the products of Israeli settlements, and 79% think that it will have a positive impact on a national level.
- Salam Fayyad is the most favored leader to be the next president, in case President Abbas did not run for elections and if Marwan Barghouthi does not run.
- In response to the question on the indirect negotiations sessions between the Palestinians and the Israeli sides, 60% oppose this kind of negotiations.
- The general support for the peace settlements with Israel has decreased down to 59%, while 58% continue to oppose Hamas' position towards the elimination of Israel.
- When the respondents were asked about the best way to end the internal dispute between Fateh and Hamas, 62% believe that it is by working on the issues of agreement while postponing the issues of disagreement between the two parties, 17% believe that ending the internal feud is by Hamas relinquishing its over the Gaza Strip, 3% proposed that Fateh should accept Hamas' requirements, 12% said other matters, while 7% thinks that no agreement can be achieved at all.
- About the voting preference of the respondents, the results show that 50% said that they would vote for Fateh in case the presidential election were held next week, compared with 7% that would vote for Hamas, while 10% mentioned the candidates of other groups. Still 34% will not vote or refrain, especially amongst women (42%).
- As for the legislative elections, 53% expressed their support for the Fateh candidates, as opposed to 7% who said that they vote for Hamas, 9% for others and 32% said that they will refrain.
- On a question about the registration for local election, 39% said that they did not and that they do not intend to do so and 5% said that they will register later. About 56% said that they did register indeed.
- The majority seems pessimistic towards holding new elections in the oPt. About 47% of the respondents said that the local elections in the West Bank will confront hurdles, and 81% in the Gaza Strip.
- More than the half (49%) expressed their trust towards Abbas, and 13% for Hanieh, while 38% said neither. The greater part (61%) gives the legitimacy for Fayyad government, and 11% for Hanieh government, noting that 28% believes that neither is legitimate.





- 46% of the respondents think that Fayyad's strategy in declaring the Palestinian state in 2011 while still under occupation is rational and applicable, while 54% believe it is not.
- On the same level, 82% said that the policies pursued by Fayyad serve the Palestinian interests, compared with 18% who think it serves the Israeli interests. The greater part (78%) see that it serves the national interests versus 22% said it serves his personal interests and goals.
- The results also show that 72% think that Fayyad is capable to be the next president versus 28% who opposed the idea. About Fayyad's relation with Fateh movement, 27% said that Fayyad is independent to a large extent from Fateh, 38% said that he is independent to some extent, and 34% think that he is strongly linked to Fateh.
- Also 46% think that Fayyad is strongly loyal to the Palestinian national cause while 39% think that he is to some extent while 15% believe otherwise.
- Regarding the Palestinian next president, in case Abbas wouldn't nominate himself, 41% favored Salam Fayyad, 20% chose Dahlan, 11% Saeb Ireqat, while 2% for Azzam El Ahmad, and 23% chose other personalities.
- When the respondents were given the choice between Marwan Barghouti the imprisoned Fateh leader, and Salam Fayyad, the majority 54% chose Barghouti to be the next president, while 29% selected Fayyad, and 17% said neither, noting that this option not mentioned to the respondents.
- In a question on how the Palestinians identify themselves, over half (57%) identified themselves as Muslims, 25% as Palestinians, 12% as human beings and 6% as Arabs.
- The majority, (70%) of the Palestinian said that there is no positive change in the US position towards their affairs, focused in particular between those who trust Fateh with (40%). Only 30% who think there is a change can be mentioned.
- Out of April survey results, Al Quds newspaper occupies the first position in being the most trusted newspaper; The Qatar-based Al Jazeera remains as the most trusted TV station in the oPt.






### III. General situation

#### A. Level of concern

Concern over the future has always been high among the Palestinian people irrespective of their poverty level, gender, age, etc. As illustrated in the figure, below, more than 80%, of the respondents said that they are concerned.

The lack of progress on the external and internal political fronts probably explains why the level of concern among the supporters of Fateh is more intense than among the Hamas supporters. Whereas 46% of the Fateh supporters affirmed their extreme concern with the situation in general, the percentage among their counterparts from the Hamas supporters is 30%. These results are overviewed in tables 1 and 2, below.

**Figure 2: Level of concern**



**Table 1: Level of concern about the current situation according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
<b>Extremely concerned</b>	37%	47%	46%	30%	50%	45%
<b>Concerned to some extent</b>	44%	39%	40%	47%	35%	39%
<b>Not very concerned</b>	16%	12%	12%	16%	13%	12%
<b>Not concerned at all</b>	3%	2%	1%	6%	2%	4%




**Table 2: Level of concern about the current situation according to gender, age and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category					Poverty	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>Extremely concerned</b>	43%	39%	35%	38%	47%	43%	47%	40%	43%
<b>Concerned to some extent</b>	39%	45%	45%	42%	40%	44%	37%	45%	39%
<b>Not very concerned</b>	15%	14%	18%	18%	11%	9%	14%	12%	16%
<b>Not concerned at all</b>	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%	4%	2%	3%	1%

While the main individual source of concern is the economic condition of the household, as illustrated in figure 3, below, the political situation remains to be the Palestinians' main apprehension. About 11% of the respondents mentioned the Israeli occupation (19%)<sup>1</sup>, said the internal power struggle, (14%) the absence of security and (4%) mentioned the family problems.

Concern over the economy is more notable among the respondents who live in the West Bank and below the poverty level. 37% of Hamas supporters believe that the internal struggle is their fundamental concern and the majority dwells in Gaza Strip compared to 34% of Fateh supporters whose main concern is the economic hardships.

**Figure 3: The main reason for feeling concerned**



<sup>1</sup> Israel occupation was deliberately excluded from the list of possible answers as this option will be the most mentioned reason if it was included in the list.



**Table 3: The main reason for feeling concerned according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
The economic hardship of my household	43%	35%	43%	29%	37%	39%
The absence of security for me and my family	14%	15%	14%	10%	14%	14%
The internal power struggle	13%	28%	21%	37%	20%	18%
The Israeli occupation	12%	10%	11%	5%	16%	13%
Family problems	5%	2%	4%	2%	4%	4%
I have no concerns	14%	9%	8%	17%	10%	12%

**Table 4: Main issue that makes you feel concerned according to gender, age and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category				Poverty		
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
The economic hardship of my household	41%	38%	33%	36%	42%	51%	42%	42%	38%
The absence of security for me and my family	13%	15%	16%	18%	12%	11%	13%	14%	14%
The internal power struggle	20%	18%	19%	17%	25%	14%	19%	16%	22%
The Israeli occupation	11%	12%	10%	11%	10%	15%	13%	11%	11%
Family problems	3%	5%	5%	4%	4%	1%	4%	6%	2%
I have no concerns	12%	11%	16%	14%	8%	8%	10%	11%	12%

**B. Feeling of security**

The majority of the Palestinians feel insecure towards themselves, their families and properties. In response to the question about whether they feel secure, 53% said that they don't, as noted in figure 4.

The feeling of insecurity is significantly higher among the Fateh respondents and the respondents that come from the Gaza Strip. As noted in tables 5 and 6, below, whereas 30% of the respondents that trust Hamas said that they feel insecure, the percentage among the respondents that trust Fateh reaches 54% and it reaches 50% among the respondents that do not trust any political or religious faction.



Figure 4: Feeling of insecurity (January 2007 till May 2010)




Table 5: Feeling of insecurity according to region and faction

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
I feel secure	58%	45%	46%	70%	46%	50%
I do not feel secure	42%	55%	54%	30%	54%	50%

Table 6: Feeling of insecurity according to gender, age and poverty level

	Gender		Age category				Poverty		
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
I feel secure	57%	49%	49%	54%	53%	55%	58%	50%	55%
I do not feel secure	43%	51%	51%	46%	47%	45%	42%	50%	45%


C. Identity

As indicated, below, more than half of the Palestinian public identify themselves as primarily Muslims. Only 25% identified themselves as Palestinians first. The importance of identity in shaping political and social attitudes prompted NEC to start monitoring the notion of identity regularly for the hope of shedding more light on the way Palestinians



think about their lives in general and about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in particular. As noted in tables 7 and 8, below, identification with Islam is prominent among all sectors of the Palestinian society, including those that are received to be less religious, such as those who support left parties. Although 73% of the respondents that trust Hamas identify with Islam, first, 50% of the respondents of Fateh also identify with Islam first. Respondents that do not trust any faction are somewhat closer to the position of Fateh in this regard.

**Figure 5: Self identification**



**Table 7: Self identification according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Muslim First	54%	63%	50%	73%	48%	62%
Palestinian First	26%	22%	33%	13%	20%	22%
Arab First	6%	6%	7%	3%	15%	4%
Human being first	14%	9%	10%	10%	17%	11%
Other	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%

**Table 8: Self identification according to gender, age and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category					Poverty	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Muslim First	58%	57%	55%	56%	62%	58%	58%	61%	53%
Palestinian First	25%	24%	29%	24%	21%	24%	24%	23%	26%
Arab First	7%	5%	6%	6%	6%	6%	6%	5%	7%
Human being first	10%	14%	10%	13%	11%	12%	12%	10%	13%
Other	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%



#### IV. Palestinian politics


##### A. Leadership

As illustrated in figure 6, below, about 38% of the respondents do not have trust in any of the two main leaders of the Palestinians: Abbas and Hanieh, even though trust in Abbas seems to be much more evident than it is the case for Hanieh.

Naturally, support for Abu Mazen is wide spreads among the respondents that trust Fateh most (84%), while support for Hanieh is supported by 87% of the Hamas supporters. Of those who do not trust any faction, 71% do not trust either leader

Generally speaking, support for President Abbas is higher in the West Bank (54%) than in the Gaza Strip (42%), among male respondents, older generation respondents and respondents that are economically better off, as noted in tables 9 and 10, below.

**Figure 6: Trust Abu Mazen vs. Hanieh**





**Table 9: Trust in Abu Mazen vs. trust in Ismael Hanieh according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
<b>Abu Mazen</b>	54%	42%	84%	5%	32%	20%
<b>Ismael Hanieh</b>	8%	19%	2%	87%	11%	9%
<b>Neither</b>	37%	39%	14%	7%	57%	71%

**Table 10: Trust in Abu Mazen vs. trust in Ismael Hanieh according to gender, age and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category				Poverty		
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>Abu Mazen</b>	57%	40%	43%	48%	60%	48%	45%	44%	56%
<b>Ismael Hanieh</b>	14%	11%	11%	12%	14%	15%	12%	14%	12%
<b>Neither</b>	28%	49%	46%	39%	25%	37%	43%	42%	32%

**B. Factional support**

Factional support is not dissimilar from leadership support. While 8% of the respondents indicated their trust in Hamas and 48% in Fateh, 36% of the respondents stated their lack of trust in any of the existing political or religious factions.

As it is the case with leadership support, level of support for Fateh is more prominent among the West Bank respondents. Whereas, for example, 52% of the West Bank respondents indicated their trust in Fateh, the percentage in the Gaza Strip was only 44%. Conversely, whereas the level of support for Hamas in the West Bank did not exceed 5%, the percentage in the Gaza Strip was 3 times as much, as noted in table 11.

Support for Fateh is also more pronounced among males than among females, and among the respondents that are economically better off than among those who are economically not as fortunate. Also, lack of trust in any faction is higher among females (45%) than among males (27%).

The relatively strong trust in Fateh is due to its pluralistic nature. Fateh absorbs many ideologies and accommodates diverse views on such issues as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the role of religion...etc. The plurality of Fateh, however, prevents it from placing candidates that are agreeable to the diverse Fateh constituents, an issue that may reflect negatively on their success in future elections.





Figure 7: Factional trust




Table 11: Factional trust according to region of residence

	Region of residence	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Fateh	52%	44%
Hamas	5%	14%
Others	7%	8%
None	37%	35%

Table 12: Factional trust according to gender, age and poverty

	Gender		Age category				Poverty		
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	Over 55	Below poverty	Above poverty
Fateh	56%	40%	50%	46%	51%	47%	48%	47%	50%
Hamas	9%	7%	5%	9%	13%	9%	0%	8%	9%
Others	7%	7%	9%	5%	7%	6%	14%	8%	7%
None	27%	45%	36%	41%	29%	37%	38%	36%	35%



**C. The Gaza vs. Ramallah governments**

Previous surveys by NEC showed that support for Fateh is largely based on the belief that Fateh is more realistic while support for Hamas is closely related to the religiosity of Palestinians and the identification they have with Islam.


In measuring the extent to which Fateh and Hamas are perceived politically by the Palestinians, a number of questions have been asked regularly to the Palestinians. The first is related to the type of strategy the Palestinians find to be more appropriate for the materialization of the Palestinian national interest and the other is related to the perception about the legality of the Ramallah vs. the Gaza governments.

**1. Attitude about the Best strategy**

Despite the strong identification people have with Islam, only 10% of the respondents said that the Hamas strategy is the best for maximizing Palestinian national interest. Conversely, 59% believe that the Fateh strategy is the most appropriate.

Once again, distrust in both the Hamas and Fateh policies and strategies is reflected more among the respondents that do not trust any faction (65%), among female respondents (36%), and among the respondents that live in poverty (34%). These and other results are previewed in tables 13 and 14, below.

**Figure 8: The best strategy to achieve the national supreme interests**





**Table 13: The best strategy to achieve national interest according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
<b>The strategy of Fateh</b>	64%	51%	94%	4%	40%	28%
<b>The strategy of Hamas</b>	6%	16%	1%	86%	9%	7%
<b>Neither</b>	30%	32%	6%	10%	51%	65%

**Table 14: The best strategy to achieve national interest according to gender, age and poverty**

	Gender		Age category					Poverty	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>The strategy of Fateh</b>	63%	53%	57%	57%	62%	62%	56%	55%	62%
<b>The strategy of Hamas</b>	10%	10%	9%	9%	14%	13%	4%	11%	10%
<b>Neither</b>	26%	36%	34%	34%	23%	25%	40%	34%	28%


**2. Attitude about the legitimate government in the oPt**

Given the lack of trust on many issues related to both Fateh and Hamas, Palestinian public perceptions slightly changes when the questions were associated with the Fayyad government. As indicated in figure, below, support for the Fayyad government reaches 61% as opposed to 11% for the Hanieh Government. Whereas, as indicated earlier, about 36% voiced their lack of trust in either Fateh or Hamas leaderships, only 28% of the respondents said neither government is illegitimate. Further analysis shows that the reason is because a significant percentage of the respondents that do not trust anyone gave their support to Salam Fayyad who is known to be independent and not affiliated to any of the political or religious factions. Still, Fayyad also gained significant support from the Fateh supporters.

When examined according to the other explanatory variables, it is found that Fateh supporters and Westbankers strongly favor the Fayyad government while Hamas supporters go for the Hanieh government. Support for the Fayyad government in Gaza is strong but not on the same level as that observed in the West Bank. These and other results are overviewed in tables 15 and 16, below.



**Figure 9: The legitimate government in the oPt (Sep 2007 till May 2010)**



**Table 15: The legitimate government in the oPt according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
The Salam Fayyad government	66%	54%	94%	6%	47%	38%
The Hanieh government	6%	19%	1%	86%	20%	7%
No one is legitimate	27%	28%	5%	8%	33%	55%

**Table 16: The legitimate government in the oPt according to gender, age category and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category					Poverty	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
The Fayyad government	65%	57%	61%	60%	67%	60%	56%	58%	64%
The Hanieh government	11%	11%	9%	10%	15%	13%	9%	12%	11%
No one is legitimate	24%	32%	30%	30%	18%	27%	35%	30%	25%

## V. Palestinian Israeli relations


### A. The peace settlement

Although the general support for a peace settlement with Israel has decreased down from 63% in April to 59% in May 2010, the majority of the Palestinian population continues to favor the peace option for solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.



Even among the supporters of Hamas, 23%, as opposed to 76% among the Fateh supporters, support a peace settlement with Israel. As pointed out in table 17, 48% of the non-partisans support reaching a peace settlement. The drop in support for a peace settlement may be explained by the recent event regarding the Israeli attack on the Gaza Freedom flotilla, which was attempting to break the blockade of Gaza and deliver humanitarian aid and building supplies to the strip.

**Figure 10: Support or oppose a peace settlement with Israel**



**Table 17: Support or opposition to a peace settlement with Israel according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
<b>Support</b>	60%	57%	76%	23%	71%	48%
<b>Oppose</b>	40%	43%	24%	77%	29%	52%

**Table 18: Support or opposition to a peace settlement with Israel according to gender, age and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category				Poverty	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Above poverty
<b>Support</b>	62%	56%	47%	61%	65%	60%	66%	55%
<b>Oppose</b>	38%	44%	53%	39%	35%	40%	34%	45%




### B. Hamas and Israel

The attitude towards the position of Hamas towards the existence of the state of Israel carries a lot of significance and provides explanations about the extent to which the Palestinian public accepts coexistence with Israel. Since NEC started its monthly survey more than four years ago, the respondents were asked about whether they approved of Hamas' position towards Israel, a position which essentially opposes the presence of Israel on the historic land of Palestine. As illustrated in figure 11, below, more than half (58%) of the Palestinians rejects the position of Hamas. This position is shared by most Palestinians except by the majority of the supporters of Hamas who line behind the organization.

When examining the results according to the demographic characteristics of the population, it is evident that the younger the respondents are the more likely they are to support the position of Hamas towards the existence of Israel (49% of the respondents between the age of 18 and 24 support the position of Hamas while only 40% of the respondents over the age of 55 share their view). This is also the case for the respondents that are economically worse off. Whereas 46% of the respondents that live in poverty support Hamas' position, the percentage among the respondents that are economically better off is only 39%. This and other results are overviewed in tables 19 and 20, below.

**Figure 11: Attitude about whether Hamas should maintain its position on the elimination of Israel**





**Table 19: Support or oppose Hamas' position towards the elimination of Israel according to region and faction**

	Region of residence		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Hamas should maintain its position on Israel	43%	41%	31%	79%	41%	42%
Hamas should change its position regarding Israel	57%	59%	69%	21%	59%	58%

**Table 20: Support or oppose Hamas' position towards the elimination of Israel according to gender, age category and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category				Poverty		
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Hamas should maintain its position on Israel	40%	45%	49%	43%	36%	38%	40%	46%	39%
Hamas should change its position regarding Israel	60%	55%	51%	57%	64%	62%	60%	54%	61%

**C. indirect negotiations with Israel**

Although the support for peace settlement with Israel has decreased down to 59%, as mentioned earlier, over half of the respondents (60%) oppose the idea of indirect negotiations with Israel. This view is stronger among the respondents that trust Hamas and the respondents that do not trust any faction. Moreover, a sizable minority of the Fateh supporters (47%) shares this view.


Even this view is shared with the Israelis, for example, as Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, declared one time that: "Peace cannot be made from a distance or by remote control, especially given that we and the Palestinians are neighbors,"<sup>2</sup>. The figure and the tables below show more about the respondents who refuse and who support the indirect negotiation.

<sup>2</sup> "PM Netanyahu welcomes beginning of proximity talks," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 9, 2010, [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2010/PM\\_Netanyahu\\_beginning\\_proximity\\_talks\\_9-May-2010.htm](http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2010/PM_Netanyahu_beginning_proximity_talks_9-May-2010.htm).





**Figure 12: The support for the indirect negotiations with Israel**



**Table 21: The support for the indirect negotiations with Israel according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
<b>Yes</b>	41%	39%	53%	23%	41%	29%
<b>No</b>	59%	61%	47%	77%	59%	71%

**Table 22: The support for the indirect negotiations with Israel according to gender, age category and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category				Poverty		
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>Yes</b>	43%	37%	35%	42%	45%	39%	39%	38%	44%
<b>No</b>	57%	63%	65%	58%	55%	61%	61%	62%	56%


**D. The Palestinian campaign for boycotting the settlements products**

In an effort to revive the Palestinian economy and to resist the Israeli occupation in a peaceful manner, the Palestinian Authority, community leaders and political movements have started a campaign to boycott Israeli settlement products.

When asked about the views towards this new policy, the great majority (85%) stated their support for the campaign. As indicated in table 23 and 24, below, this support is strong irrespective of factional support, place of residence, age, or gender.



**Figure 13: Support boycotting the settlements products**



**Table 23: Support boycotting the settlements products according to region and faction**


	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
<b>Yes</b>	86%	84%	88%	80%	91%	81%
<b>No</b>	14%	16%	12%	20%	9%	19%

**Table 24: Support boycotting the settlements products according to gender, age category and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category				Poverty		
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>Yes</b>	83%	87%	83%	85%	85%	88%	87%	82%	88%
<b>No</b>	17%	13%	17%	15%	15%	12%	13%	18%	12%

Supporting the campaign of boycotting the products of Israeli settlements may not necessary gain the same support in considering its effective result. As illustrated in figure 14, 79% think it will have a positive impact on the national level, compared with 85% who said they support it. Again, the effectiveness of this campaign is also perceived rather strongly by all sectors of society.

**Figure 14: The respondents who think that boycotting the settlements products will have a positive effect on the national interests**





**Table 25: The respondents who think that boycotting settlement products will have a positive effect on the national interests according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
<b>Yes</b>	79%	80%	83%	81%	73%	78%
<b>No</b>	21%	20%	17%	19%	27%	22%

**Table 26: The respondents who think that boycotting settlement products will have a positive impact on the national interest according to gender, age category and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category				Poverty		
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>Yes</b>	75%	83%	76%	81%	83%	80%	76%	79%	80%
<b>No</b>	25%	17%	24%	19%	17%	20%	24%	21%	20%

## VI. NEC’s Elections Monitor

It is more than four years since the last Palestinian elections took place. The elections which have split the Palestinians and provided Israel with ample justifications to stall and obstruct any progress aimed at ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Ironically, many argue these days that new elections in Palestine will prove to be the salvation for the many obstacles confronting the Palestinians both internally and externally. Despite the significant hurdles that confront these elections, the Palestine Liberation Organization has decided to proceed with elections on the local government level<sup>3</sup>; in an attempt to end the current impasse.

In order to gauge public opinion regarding the elections, NEC will add a series of questions every month aiming to develop a sense of the value of these elections and the extent to which they will have a positive impact in as far as the Palestinian-Palestinian conflict is concerned.

<sup>3</sup> The decision was postponed recently apparently as a result of lack of consensus among the Fateh leadership regarding the Fateh nominees.




**A. Registration for elections**

When the respondents (from the West Bank only<sup>4</sup>) were asked about whether they registered for the elections, 39% said that they did not and that they do not intend to do so and 5% said that they will register later. About 56% said that they did register indeed.

As noted in table 27, below, the proportion of Hamas supporters who said that they did register for elections is 28%, as opposed to 57% from among the supporters of Fateh. As for the respondents that do not trust any faction, the level of registration for elections reached 27%. Surprisingly, only 36% of the female respondents said that they did register while the percentage among the male registration reached 47%.

**Figure 15: The registration for the local elections**



**Table 27: The registration for the local elections according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
<b>Yes</b>	56%	19%	57%	28%	45%	27%
<b>No, and I do not intend to register</b>	39%	74%	36%	65%	49%	66%
<b>No, but I will register soon</b>	5%	7%	7%	7%	6%	7%

<sup>4</sup> Because Hamas opposes to carry out the elections in the Gaza Strip




**Table 28: The registration for the local elections according to gender, age and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category					Poverty	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>Yes</b>	47%	36%	37%	38%	51%	48%	34%	38%	46%
<b>No, and I do not intend to register</b>	48%	57%	57%	57%	41%	48%	61%	56%	49%
<b>No, but I will register soon</b>	5%	7%	6%	5%	8%	5%	5%	6%	5%

**B. Attitude towards local elections (April 2010)**

To a large minority of the Palestinians, local elections will face obstacles. About 47% of the respondents said that the local elections in the West Bank will confront hurdles, and 81% in the Gaza Strip. This view is held by even 72% of the respondents supporting Fateh and by 76% of those supporting Hamas. As noted in tables 29 and 30, below, concern about the smoothness of elections in the West Bank is visible more among females than males and among the younger generation more so than among the older generations.

**Figure 16: The opinion towards whether the local present elections would face any obstacles (April 2010)**





**Table 29: The opinion towards whether the local present elections would face any obstacles according to region and faction**

		Region of residence			Factional trust		
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
In the oPt	Yes	66%	84%	72%	76%	79%	76%
	No	34%	16%	28%	24%	21%	24%
In Gaza Strip	Yes	78%	87%	85%	69%	84%	81%
	No	22%	13%	15%	31%	16%	19%
In the West Bank	Yes	47%	48%	32%	65%	55%	58%
	No	53%	52%	68%	35%	45%	42%

**Table 30: The opinion towards whether the local present elections would face any obstacles according to gender, age and poverty level**

		Gender		Age category				Poverty		
		Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
In the oPt	Yes	73%	74%	78%	79%	76%	66%	55%	75%	72%
	No	27%	26%	22%	21%	24%	34%	45%	25%	28%
In Gaza Strip	Yes	80%	82%	84%	86%	84%	79%	62%	81%	80%
	No	20%	18%	16%	14%	16%	21%	38%	19%	20%
In the West Bank	Yes	38%	57%	56%	48%	49%	41%	34%	47%	47%
	No	62%	43%	44%	52%	51%	59%	66%	53%	53%

**C. Preference for the affiliation of the presidential candidate**


As was the case with factional and leadership support, the preference people have about the presidential candidate they will vote for if elections were held soon is the same. As pointed out in figure 17, below, 50% said that they will vote for the Fateh candidate and 7% mentioned the Hamas candidate but a full 34% said that they will refrain from voting for any candidate. Only 10% said that they will elect another candidate.

The proportion of respondents that said that they will not participate in the elections is higher among women (42%) than men (25%) and among the respondents that live in poverty (35%) as opposed to those that are economically better off (30%). As would be expected, 64% of the respondents that do not trust any faction said that they will not participate in the elections.



Clearly, the strongest support for the Fateh candidate is from within the supporters of Fateh and from the male respondents. A large proportion of females said that they will not participate, as noted in table 32.

**Figure 17: The affiliation of the presidential candidate that the respondents would vote for in case elections were held next week (comparison between Jan 2010 and May 2010)**



**Table 31: The affiliation of the presidential candidate that the respondents would vote for in case elections were held next week according to region and faction**

	Region of residence		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
A candidates of Fateh	52%	46%	94%	4%	19%	18%
A candidates of Hamas	4%	13%	0%	71%	2%	5%
Other candidates	10%	10%	2%	3%	39%	14%
I Will not vote or refrain	34%	32%	4%	22%	40%	64%

**Table 32: The affiliation of the presidential candidate that the respondents would vote for in case elections were held next week according to gender, age and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category					Poverty	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
A candidates of Fateh	57%	42%	47%	51%	55%	49%	45%	47%	53%
A candidates of Hamas	7%	7%	6%	6%	12%	8%	0%	6%	8%
Other candidates	10%	9%	10%	7%	8%	10%	18%	11%	9%
I Will not vote or refrain	25%	42%	36%	37%	25%	32%	37%	35%	30%






**D. Preference for the affiliation of the candidates for the legislative body**

The results for the legislative election are more or less the same as for presidential elections. About 53% of the respondents said that they will vote for the Fateh candidate while only 7% mentioned the Hamas candidate. 32% indicated their reluctance to participate in the elections, as portrayed in figure 18, below.

Support for Fateh is not as unified as it may seem to be because Fateh means different things to different people. Fateh includes within its supporters the secularists as well as the religious, the supporters of reconciliation as well as the opponents of reconciliation. Its leaders mirror this diversity and, consequently, it is unlikely that the general support the organization has in polls will translate to actual

As is the case with the attitude with the presidential elections, the respondents that indicated their unwillingness to participate were females and among the younger respondents.

**Figure 18: The party that the respondents would vote for in case the legislative elections were held next week (comparison between Jan 2010 and May 2010)**



**Table 33: The party that the respondents would vote for in case the legislative elections were held next week according to region and faction**

	Region of residence		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Fateh list	56%	48%	94%	6%	23%	22%
Hamas list	3%	12%	0%	73%	2%	2%
Others	9%	9%	1%	3%	44%	12%
I will not vote or refrain	33%	31%	4%	18%	30%	63%



**Table 34: The party that the respondents would vote for in case the legislative elections were held next week according to gender, age category and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category					Poverty	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>Fateh list</b>	61%	44%	51%	52%	58%	52%	48%	51%	55%
<b>Hamas list</b>	7%	6%	5%	6%	11%	9%	0%	7%	7%
<b>Others</b>	9%	9%	8%	6%	8%	11%	14%	8%	9%
<b>I will not vote or refrain</b>	24%	41%	36%	36%	22%	29%	38%	34%	29%


## VII. Attitudes towards Fayyad’s policies

### A. Fayyad’s future state

As an independent political actor and leader who is neither a member of Fateh nor of Hamas, Salam Fayyad has been very controversial prime minister both on the international scene as well as on the local level. His speeches reiterate that Palestinians have to build their state now by building a strong economy and fundamental infrastructure. In an attempt to examine the extent to which his policies and actions are perceived positively by the Palestinian public that identifies itself with one of the political parties, NEC drafted some questions in the May survey.

In a question about the respondents’ attitude towards Fayyad’s declaration of a Palestinian state by the end of 2011, more than half (54%) did not share his optimism. This position is shared by most Palestinians except by Fateh supporters of which 63% think Fayyad’s declaration is rational and could be achieved.

**Figure 19: Attitudes towards Fayyad’s Declaration of the Palestinian state till the end of 2011 as being realistic and achievable**





**Table 35: Attitudes towards Fayyad’s Declaration of the Palestinian state till the end of 2011 as being realistic and achievable according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Yes	47%	43%	63%	26%	31%	38%
No	53%	57%	37%	74%	69%	62%

**Table 36: Attitudes towards Fayyad’s Declaration of the Palestinian state till the end of 2011 as being realistic and achievable according to gender, age category and poverty level**


	Gender		Age category				Poverty		
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Yes	46%	46%	47%	42%	48%	47%	45%	45%	45%
No	54%	54%	53%	58%	52%	53%	55%	55%	55%

**B. Fayyad’s resistance mainstream**

In April 2010, NEC questioned the respondents about their opinion towards Fayyad's assertion pertaining to resisting the occupation in peaceful ways. As portrayed in figure 20, below, only 20% said that it is not important and 42% said that despite its importance, such a strategy will not succeed. Only 38% said that such a strategy will bear fruits.

The support for this specific strategy, and the assurance of its success was more pronounced in the West Bank where most of Fayyad’s supporters resides, and from within Fateh supporters. While the respondents who did not negate its usefulness, but are not confident about its success were more from among the Hamas supporters and from among the respondents that live in the Gaza Strip, and among the young generation.

**Figure 20: The opinion about Salam Fayyad position to resist the occupation in peaceful ways (April 2010)**





**Table 37: The opinion about Salam Fayyad position to resist the occupation in peaceful ways according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
It's necessary and will succeed	44%	28%	49%	16%	31%	30%
It's necessary and will not work	37%	49%	44%	50%	32%	42%
It's not necessary	18%	23%	8%	34%	37%	28%


**Table 38: The opinion about Salam Fayyad position to resist the occupation in peaceful ways according to gender, age category and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category				Poverty		
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
It's necessary and will succeed	41%	36%	42%	28%	39%	40%	51%	40%	38%
It's necessary and will not work	39%	45%	43%	53%	39%	33%	30%	40%	42%
It's not necessary	21%	20%	16%	19%	23%	26%	18%	19%	21%

**C. Fayyad's scope of work**

In another question on Fayyad's policies, the majority (82%) thinks that Fayyad's policies are directed to the interests of the Palestinians. Only 18% said that they are beneficial to Israel. When examined according to the explanatory variables, it is found that the respondents who trust Fayyad's policies are males more than females, and live in the West Bank, as overviewed in tables 39 and 41, below.

**Figure 21: Attitudes about the interests of Fayyad's policy**





**Table 39: Attitudes about the interests of Fayyad's policy according to region and faction**


	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
<b>Palestinians interest</b>	89%	71%	95%	34%	65%	73%
<b>Israelis interests</b>	11%	29%	5%	66%	35%	27%

**Table 40: Attitudes about the interests of Fayyad's policy according to gender, age category and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category				Poverty		
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>Palestinians interest</b>	86%	76%	78%	83%	82%	84%	86%	80%	82%
<b>Israelis interests</b>	14%	24%	22%	17%	18%	16%	14%	20%	18%

The positive attitude people have about Fayyad and his policies are also reflected in the attitude people have about the concern Fayyad have about the national interest. In response to the question about whether Salam Fayyad works for his personal interests or for the interest of the Palestinians, (78%) said it's for the national interest, and that Fayyad's plan to build the future state serves the Palestinian not his own benefits. Still, 22% think that Fayyad works for his own benefit. The respondents that hold this view are primarily from among the supporters of Hamas, among females, those that live in the Gaza Strip and among those that live below the poverty level. For more details, see tables 41 and 42, below.

**Figure 22: Attitudes towards the interests of Fayyad's policy**





**Table 41: Attitudes towards the interests of Fayyad's policy according to region and faction**


	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
<b>His own interests</b>	17%	30%	11%	61%	35%	29%
<b>The national interests</b>	83%	70%	89%	39%	65%	71%

**Table 42: Attitudes towards the interests of Fayyad's policy according to gender, age category and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category				Poverty		
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>His own interests</b>	18%	27%	27%	19%	24%	20%	18%	25%	18%
<b>The national interests</b>	82%	73%	73%	81%	76%	80%	82%	75%	82%

Moreover, as illustrated in figure 23, below, about 85% of the respondents believe that Fayyad is loyal to the Palestinian cause. Generally speaking support for Fayyad's loyalty is wide spread among the respondents that trust Fateh most (96%), and in the West Bank with 91%, as noted in both tables 43 and 44, below.

**Figure 23: Fayyad's Loyalty to Palestinian cause**





**Table 43: Fayyad's Loyalty to Palestinian cause according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Loyal in large extent	51%	38%	64%	11%	41%	30%
Loyal to some extent	40%	39%	32%	36%	36%	51%
Not loyal	9%	23%	4%	53%	23%	20%


**Table 44: Fayyad's Loyalty to Palestinian cause according to gender, age category and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category				Poverty		
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Loyal in large extent	51%	38%	44%	45%	49%	48%	41%	45%	47%
Loyal to some extent	37%	43%	40%	41%	35%	38%	47%	38%	40%
Not loyal	12%	19%	16%	14%	16%	13%	12%	17%	12%

**D. Fayyad and Fateh movement**

The greater part of the respondents, (65%) believes that Fayyad is independent from Fateh movement while only 34% who said he depends on Fateh in his direction and scope of work. Looking at the demographics variable below, it seems that the females are skeptical of Fayyad's independence from Fateh more so than men, so are the respondents that live in poverty, and the respondents that trust neither Fateh nor Hamas. These and other results are overviewed in tables 45 and 46, below.

**Figure 24: Fayyad's independence from Fateh movement**







**Table 45: Fayyad's independence from Fateh movement according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Independent to a large extent	28%	27%	36%	13%	17%	21%
Independent to some extent	41%	35%	32%	55%	53%	40%
Not independent	31%	38%	32%	32%	29%	39%


**Table 46: Fayyad's independence from Fateh movement according to gender, age category and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category					Poverty	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Independent to a large extent	34%	19%	19%	32%	28%	29%	29%	23%	32%
Independent to some extent	40%	36%	44%	37%	33%	41%	38%	35%	42%
Not independent	26%	45%	37%	31%	38%	30%	32%	42%	26%

**E. Fayyad and the next presidency**

After reviewing the Palestinian point of view towards Fayyad's policies, NEC asked another question regarding Fayyad's competence and whether he deserves to be the next president. The majority gave the confidence by saying that Fayyad is capable to be a president. His approach and ways of building the state seems to be appealing to the Palestinian public. The respondents who trust Fayyad as a president are males more so than females, who dwell in the West Bank and who are economically better off. These percentages and other are shown in the tables, below.

**Figure 25: Opinions about Fayyad's capability as a president**





**Table 47: Opinions about Fayyad’s capability as a president according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Capable	80%	60%	85%	27%	66%	60%
Not capable	20%	40%	15%	73%	34%	40%


**Table 48: Opinions about Fayyad’s capability as a president according to gender, age category and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category				Poverty		
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Capable	77%	64%	62%	72%	77%	78%	77%	69%	75%
Not capable	23%	36%	38%	28%	23%	22%	23%	31%	25%

**F. Fayyad versus Barghouthi**

Although the majority prefers Fayyad’s policies and approaches regarding the future state, this attractiveness changes when it is confronted with the person of the imprisoned Fateh leader Marwan Barghouthi. As indicated in figure 26, below, over half (55%) think that Marwan deserves to be the next president and 29% said that Fayyad should be the one leading the Palestinians, while 17% mentioned other leaders. The most notable percentage in this regard is the support provided to Marwan Barghouthi by the Hamas supporters (52% of Hamas supporters prefer Barghouthi while only 9% preferred Fayyad). Moreover, Barghouthi seems to enjoy more support in the Gaza Strip, among females, and among the youth, as overviewed in tables 49 and 50, below.

**Figure 26: The preferable leader for the next presidency (Fayyad vs. Barghouthi)**





**Table 49: The preferable leader for the next presidency according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
<b>Salam Fayyad</b>	34%	23%	41%	9%	30%	22%
<b>Marwan Barghouthi</b>	51%	59%	54%	52%	56%	56%
<b>Neither</b>	15%	18%	4%	39%	14%	22%


**Table 50: The preferable leader for the next presidency according to gender, age category and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category					Poverty	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>Salam Fayyad</b>	35%	22%	25%	30%	30%	27%	39%	26%	31%
<b>Marwan Barghouthi</b>	48%	62%	66%	51%	52%	52%	43%	57%	53%
<b>Neither</b>	17%	16%	9%	19%	18%	21%	18%	17%	15%

### VIII. Next presidency

Despite the support that Marwan Barghouthi enjoys amongst the Palestinians, he remains in jail and it is not clear as to whether Israel will release him during any future presidential elections. Given this fact, NEC opted to ask a question about whom do Palestinians prefer to be their next president in case President Abbas and Marwan Barghouthi did not run. The list that was provided to the respondents included primarily Fateh leaders and Fayyad's name was not included. Despite his omission from the list, the greater part, 41%, chose Salam Fayyad, followed by Dahlan with 20%, and 26% said other leaders. The majority of Hamas supporters 48% chose Fayyad, compared with 42% of Fateh supporters, a point that confirms the independence of Fayyad from Fateh. The respondents who preferred Fayyad live mostly in the West Bank, while Dahlan's popularity (35%) concentrated in the Gaza Strip (versus only 9% in the West Bank).

**Figure 27: The favor next president**





**Table 51: The favor next president according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
<b>Azzam Al-Ahmed</b>	2%	3%	3%	2%	0%	3%
<b>Saeb Ireqat</b>	9%	13%	16%	6%	12%	6%
<b>Mohammad Dahlan</b>	9%	35%	28%	2%	15%	17%
<b>Salam Fayyad</b>	45%	36%	42%	48%	44%	43%
<b>Other leader</b>	34%	13%	11%	43%	29%	31%

**Table 52: The favor next president according to gender, age category and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category					Poverty	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>Azzam Al-Ahmed</b>	2%	3%	3%	2%	2%	4%	0%	3%	2%
<b>Saeb Ireqat</b>	10%	12%	9%	14%	11%	10%	7%	11%	11%
<b>Mohammad Dahlan</b>	23%	16%	20%	24%	17%	13%	19%	20%	20%
<b>Salam Fayyad</b>	42%	41%	44%	37%	47%	39%	39%	42%	40%
<b>Other leader</b>	23%	29%	24%	23%	22%	34%	34%	25%	26%




## IX. Media perceptions

### A. The most trusted newspaper

Al Quds newspaper occupies the first position in being the most trusted newspaper. About 35% of the respondents pointed to Al-Quds newspaper as the newspaper that they trust most, followed by Al-Ayyam with 11%. Around 38% of the respondents said that they do not read newspapers.

Newspaper readership seems to be stronger in the West Bank, among the male respondents, and among the respondents that trust Fateh. About 45% of the respondents that do not trust any faction said that they do not read newspapers. These results are detailed in tables 53 and 54, below.

**Figure 28: The most trusted newspaper**



**Table 53: The most trusted newspaper according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Al-Ayyam	12%	10%	12%	9%	26%	9%
Al-Quds	46%	18%	44%	15%	46%	27%
Al-Hayyat	4%	4%	4%	3%	6%	4%
Palestine/Al-Risala	1%	10%	2%	32%	0%	4%
None	2%	8%	3%	6%	7%	6%
Others	2%	5%	3%	2%	0%	5%
Do not read newspapers	33%	45%	31%	33%	16%	45%




**Table 54: The most trusted newspaper according to gender, age category and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category					Poverty	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>Al-Ayyam</b>	11%	11%	14%	15%	9%	6%	3%	12%	10%
<b>Al-Quds</b>	40%	29%	34%	35%	34%	35%	38%	30%	39%
<b>Al-Hayyat</b>	4%	4%	5%	4%	2%	5%	6%	5%	4%
<b>Palestine/Al-Risala</b>	5%	4%	6%	2%	8%	4%	1%	4%	4%
<b>None</b>	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	5%	4%	4%
<b>Others</b>	4%	2%	3%	2%	3%	4%	5%	1%	4%
<b>Do not read newspapers</b>	31%	44%	33%	37%	39%	43%	42%	43%	35%

**B. Attitudes towards the most trusted TV station**

The Qatar-based Al Jazeera remains to be the most trusted TV station by the Palestinian public with about 48% of them said that it is the channel they trust most. Palestine TV which broadcasts from the West Bank was ranked 2<sup>nd</sup> with 15% of the public favoring it. Al-Aqsa TV station which is the mouthpiece of Hamas in the Gaza Strip was cited by 2% of the respondents.

**Figure 29: The most trusted Satellite channel**





**Table 55: The most trusted Satellite channel according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Palestine TV	17%	13%	27%	3%	28%	6%
Al-Arrabiyah	11%	19%	26%	0%	0%	9%
Al-Jazeera	52%	42%	33%	75%	45%	56%
Al-Manar	4%	4%	2%	3%	14%	4%
Al-Aqsa	2%	2%	0%	13%	0%	3%
BBC	1%	3%	2%	0%	0%	2%
Other Arab TV station	7%	7%	6%	5%	5%	9%
Don't Trust Any	6%	9%	4%	2%	9%	11%

**Table 56: The most trusted Satellite channel according to gender, age category and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category				Poverty		
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
Palestine TV	16%	15%	12%	15%	14%	18%	21%	14%	16%
Al-Arrabiyah	17%	12%	14%	17%	17%	12%	8%	12%	16%
Al-Jazeera	48%	48%	52%	46%	44%	48%	50%	54%	45%
Al-Manar	4%	4%	4%	3%	4%	6%	3%	4%	4%
Al-Aqsa	2%	2%	3%	2%	2%	2%	1%	3%	2%
BBC	2%	1%	2%	1%	2%	3%	0%	1%	2%
Other Arab TV station	5%	9%	7%	9%	9%	3%	4%	4%	9%
Don't Trust Any	6%	8%	5%	5%	8%	8%	12%	8%	6%

## X. The economy

### A. Evolution of poverty

The results of the May survey indicates that the poverty level of the Palestinian population has worsened in comparison with the previous two months. Currently, 50% of the respondents live in poverty, as noted in figure 30. The poverty level is significantly higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. Whereas 58% of the households in the Gaza Strip were determined as falling under the poverty line, the percentage in the West Bank is 45%, as indicated in table 61.

Moreover, this time respondents trusting Hamas seem to be the same as the Fateh respondents. Respondents that do not trust any faction fall in between the positions of



Fateh and Hamas in as far as poverty levels are concerned. Approximately 50% of the respondents that do not trust any faction live in poverty.

Figure 30: Evolution of the poverty levels in oPt




Table 57: Poverty level according to region and faction

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Below poverty	45%	58%	47%	46%	54%	50%
Above poverty	55%	42%	53%	54%	46%	50%

Table 58: Poverty level according to gender and age

	Gender		Age category				
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above
Below poverty	49%	51%	68%	38%	49%	49%	47%
Above poverty	51%	49%	32%	62%	51%	51%	53%






**B. Employment**

About 69% of the respondents that are part of the labor force said that they are fully employed, 13% partially employed, and 18% said that they were not employed at all. Unemployment levels are significantly higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. While 14% of the respondents that participate in the labor force in the West Bank said that they were unemployed, the percentage in the Gaza Strip reached 33%.

The highest levels of unemployment are among the respondents that are below the age of 24 and whose households are determined to be impoverished. As pointed out in table 34, 32% of the respondents that live in poverty said that they are not employed to a mere 13% from within the families that live above the poverty level. These and other results are overviewed in tables 59 and 60, below.

**Figure 31: Labor force**



**Table 59: Labor force according to region and faction**

	Region of residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Fully employed	74%	58%	68%	83%	59%	60%
Partially employed	12%	8%	9%	9%	24%	16%
Unemployed	14%	33%	23%	8%	17%	24%



**Table 60: Labor force according to gender, age category and poverty level**

	Gender		Age category					Poverty	
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 and above	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>Fully employed</b>	71%	59%	45%	73%	75%	72%	47%	56%	78%
<b>Partially employed</b>	10%	12%	15%	9%	8%	12%	12%	12%	9%
<b>Unemployed</b>	20%	29%	40%	19%	16%	17%	41%	32%	13%

\*\*\*\*

